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La evidencia empírica sobre los efectos de la educación sobre el crecimiento no es 
concluyente. ¿Esto significa que la educación puede ser buena, neutra o mala, según el 
caso? Mientras que el modelo en este documento se mantiene próximo a la tradición 
Heckscher-Ohlin, se muestra que contrariamente a los resultados estándar de este tipo de 
modelos, es el efecto neto de precios, impuestos y acumulación de factores que determina 
los efectos de crecimiento de tipo Rybczynski, lo que puede explicar la falta de consenso 
en la literatura empírica sobre educación y crecimiento. Un rasgo central del modelo, es 
que la acumulación de factores depende del producto de la educación, mientras que los 
cambios en la oferta de trabajo, que es lo que efectivamente determina la frontera de 
posibilidades de producción, dependen de las decisiones de los individuos sobre la 
asignación del tiempo. En el documento son discutidos los riesgos de una intervención que 
reduzca la oferta laboral, y por tanto las posibilidades de producción. El análisis tiene 
implicaciones para los hacedores de política en los países en desarrollo, donde el sector 
educación necesita ser fortalecido, ya que revela la posibilidad de una ‘mala reforma 
impositiva’ donde se obtienen los resultados contrarios a los esperados. En el documento 
se identifica una condición suficiente para evitar esta situación. 
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Abstract 
The evidence of effects of education activities on growth is mixed. So, could education be 
good, neutral, or bad, depending on the case? While the model in this paper remains close 
to the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition, it is shown that, contrary to the standard results, it is the 
net effect of prices, taxation, and accumulation of endowments that determines the 
Rybczynski-type growth effects, which may help explain the lack of consensus in the 
empirical literature on education and growth. A central feature of the model is that the 
accumulation of endowments depends on the output of education, while the changes in 
labour supply, which determine the effective production possibilities frontier, also depend 
on individuals’ decisions on allocation of time. In the paper, the risks of a labour supply-
reducing government intervention are discussed. The analysis has implications for 
policymakers in developing countries where education needs to be enhanced, as it reveals 
the possibility of a ‘bad tax reform’ where the intentions of reformers are not met by the 
results. A sufficient condition to avoid this situation is identified in the paper. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost all governments, both in developed and developing countries, allocate 
significant amounts to finance public education. For instance, in 2005, the United 
States allocated 5.3% of its GDP to public education; the United Kingdom, 5.6%; 
France, 5.7%; and Italy, 4.5%. In Latin America, the fraction of GDP allocated to 
public education in general is not that high but is still significant. For instance, in 
2004, for Brazil it was 4%; Argentina, 3.8%; Chile, 3.7%; Mexico, 5.4%; Paraguay, 
4%; and Uruguay, 2.6% (UNESCO, 2008). Moreover, in all cases, the vast majority 
of education provision is public (UNESCO, 2007). These facts seem to show that 
relevance of education activities are not overlooked by any government.  
However, even when the importance of education for growth has been 
highlighted by the endogenous growth literature (for instance, Romer, 1986; Lucas, 
1988), the evidence of effects on growth is mixed: the empirical literature on the 
contribution of education to growth is surveyed for instance by Temple (2000). So, 
what’s the matter? Could education be good, neutral, or bad, depending on the case? 
It could be any of them; in particular, it could be bad for two reasons: inefficient 
educational expenditure (see, for instance, Clements, 1999; Hanushek, 2002) and a 
distorting tax system to finance education (see, for instance, Glomm and Ravikumar, 
1998; Blankenau and Simpson, 2004; Blankenau et al., 2007). This paper focuses on 
the latter aspect, identifying the general equilibrium effects of taxation in a simple 
model, making it possible to deal with some analytics. Moreover, a sufficient 
condition for a growth-enhancing government intervention is identified. 
A central feature of the modelling of the education sector in this paper is the 
presence of systemic inefficiencies in terms of expected results (i.e., successful 
students and production of labour), which is the typical situation in developing 
countries. As education is publicly provided, systemic inefficiencies can be targeted 
by policymakers, and thus the process of accumulation of endowments can be 
enhanced by education policy. However, the way in which an increase in the 
education budget is financed affects the net effects on the economy of enhanced 
education, and such channels have been identified in this paper. The effects of indirect 
and income taxes are made explicit by means of some simple analytics; it is shown   2
that taxation affects the consumption-leisure choice by changing the relative prices, 
thus modifying the labour supply. This, in turn, determines the actual production 
possibilities. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the model. Section III 
describes the properties of the model as well as some policy implications. Section IV 
presents the conclusions. The Annex presents additional details for the household 
modelling. 
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The model presented here remains close to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin 
tradition, which is extended to include the public education activities that produce 
endowments (skilled and unskilled labour). The pattern of endowment growth (skilled 
and unskilled labour) is the result of the output of education, leaving aside 
demographic considerations and retirement rates. In addition, people make a 
consumption-leisure choice, so that the supply of labour is endogenous. 
The government raises revenue from taxes to provide education. However, 
there is a substantial informal sector in the economy, as there are people who have a 
preference for working informally (evading taxes). The standard leisure-work option 
is modified so that people make a choice between earning income in the informal 
sector and in the formal sector, the choice being based on the untaxed wage from the 
former and the taxed wage from the latter, with the propensity to work informally 
varying across skill groups (higher for unskilled workers). 
a) Households 
There are two representative households: one that owns only unskilled labour 
and the other that owns only skilled labour. Their decisions are taken in a two-stage 
process. In the first stage, households make a consumption-leisure choice, so that the 
total supply of both types of labour is endogenous. In the second stage, they make two 
further decisions. By the one hand, they choose between working formally and 
informally (see Annex for details). By the other hand, households allocate all their 
income (post-tax for formal activities) to all the consumption goods (see Annex for 
details).   3
It is assumed that each household’s utility function is an increasing function of 
consumption goods and leisure time. In the description that follows, the same 
subscript associates households and factors:  U S z , =  for skilled and unskilled, 
respectively. Let  z L  be the stocks of units of labour of type z .  z H  represents the 
units that the household chooses to work (so, leisure time is  z z z H L R − = ), and  z C  is 
a composite of consumption goods (see Annex for details). The CES utility function 
for household z  is  () ( )
z
z z




) 1 ( − − + = , where  0 > α , and the 
elasticity of substitution is  ( ) z z μ σ − = 1 1 ,  1 < z μ . At the top level, consumers choose 
z C  and  z H  to maximise utility subject to their budget constraint  z z z C H w C P
z
= , 
where  z w  is the wage rate for one unit of  z H  and  z C P  is the price index of the 
composite consumption good for household z  computed at consumer’s prices (see 
Annex for details). From the first-order conditions, the optimal values for 
consumption and labour supply are 
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From (1) and (2) the elasticities may be derived. The elasticity of time worked 
with respect to the wage rate is  ( ) z z z z w H L H L
z z − − = ) 1 (σ η , which is positive 
provided  z σ >1. The elasticity of demand for  Z C  with respect to prices is given by 
() () z z z z z z P C L H L H L
z C z + − − = σ η , which is negative. 
b) Producers 
There are two tradable sectors and two non-tradable sectors, informal and 
education. All sectors use skilled and unskilled labour; the exporting and informal 
activities are unskilled-intensive, whereas the import-competing and education 
activities are skilled-intensive (education will be discussed separately). There are 
competitive markets for goods and factors. All production functions are subject to   4
constant returns to scale; in the long run, equilibrium profits are zero, so prices are 
equal to unit costs. Informal activities are non-tradable and the main feature of these 
activities is that they are not subject to direct or indirect taxes, mainly owing to 
evasion. It follows that wages and prices differ between informal and formal 
activities.  
c) The education sector 
Education is publicly provided, with a budget exogenously determined. 
Following the tradition in the education production function literature (for a review, 
see Levačić and Vignoles, 2002), the output of education activities is given by 
) , ( j j j j E G F Q = , where  H B j , =  represents the level (basic and higher education), 
j Q  is the output of the activity given the resources  j G , and  j E  is the enrolment.  
The function  j F  is subject to constant returns to scale, so the output per 
student can be written as  ( ) j j j j j g F E Q q = = , where  j g  measures the resource 
intensity per student, and  0 > ∂ ∂ j j g q . For each student,  j q  is the amount of 
knowledge embodied in him/her on the successful completion of level  j , which 
builds his/her human capital. Following Hanushek (1979), students’ acquired 
knowledge defines ‘school quality’, therefore, the output per student ( j q ) measures 
school quality. The accumulation of  j q  during schooling is measured by  j f , where  j  
is the last level passed, which determines the productivity when entering the labour 
market. 
Education is a two-level activity: basic education ‘produces’ both unskilled 
workers and students qualified to enter higher education, and higher education 
‘produces’ skilled workers from qualified student inputs. School quality (output per 
student) is modelled as a major determinant of students’ path, in a similar vein to 
Heckman and Masterov (2004) who suggest that previous achievement enables future 
success, Barnes (1999) who points out that students drop out of school if they ‘fail to 
learn’, and Hanushek (2004) who shows that ‘higher student achievement keeps 
students in school longer’. Then, students’ achievement is taken as a determinant of 
early exit rates,  ( ) B q θ θ = , where  0 < ∂ ∂ B q θ .   5
The accumulation of endowments in the economy (units of each type of labour 
produced) depends on time of exit and on school quality. Thus, the size and the 
composition of the inflow of labour (in efficiency units) to the market are given by 
Z dL , i.e., 
B B U f E dL θ =   
H H S f E dL =   
where  θ  is the early exit rate, and  U dL  and  S dL  are the inflow of units of unskilled 
and skilled labour, respectively, which determine endowment growth. Thus, the rate 
of endowment growth in the economy is given by 
S S S L dL L = ˆ  
U U U L dL L = ˆ  
where  S L  and  U L  are the stocks of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, and a 
hut (^) placed over the variables denotes rate of growth. 
Then, the production of endowments may be hindered by inefficient education 
systems, which is the typical situation in developing countries where education 
quality is in general low. Thus, a government intervention consisting in an increase in 
the educational budget could enhance the process of production of endowments, by 
allowing a higher resource intensity per student and thus a higher education quality, 
improving the productivity of the activity (in terms of labour produced), and also 
causing a shift in the composition of educational output toward skilled labour. 
d) Fiscal policy 
The government raises revenue from taxes to finance the provision of 
education. The government runs a balanced budget, financed via income and indirect 
taxes in formal markets, as follows: a) Income taxes: In the formal sector, the 
determination of wages is tied to international prices, and two factor returns must be 
considered: pre- and post-tax. The firms’ expenditures on factors include taxes, and 
household incomes consist of post-tax returns. In the informal sector, where workers   6
evade income taxes, the wages paid to and received by workers are equal; b) Indirect 
taxes: Goods in the formal private sector (i.e., tradable goods) are subject to indirect 
taxes, which increase the prices faced by the household above the unit costs of 
producers. 
III. PROPERTIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Property 1: The economy’s effective supply of skills is affected by changes in 
real wages and in the output of education. 
It is easy to show that the increase in the supply of skills, totally differentiating 
(2), is given by 
() Z C z w H Z L P w H
z Z Z ˆ ˆ + =
∧
η    (3) 
As seen in section II.c), human capital accumulation ( Z L ˆ ) depends on the 
output of education. Expression (3) shows that changes in total labour supply are 
determined by changes in the output of education and changes in real wages (which 
are affected by international prices and tax policy), depending on the elasticity of 
labour supply to the wage rate. 
So, fiscal policy has general equilibrium effects on individuals’ decisions on 
labour supply and consumption. According to (3) increases in income and indirect 
taxes have a negative effect on labour supply: income taxes affect the labour-leisure 
choice reducing incentives to work; indirect taxes change relative prices making 
leisure relatively cheaper. Additionally, taxes generate a stimulus to informal 
activities, thus the general equilibrium effects from taxation also imply that the tax 
base is eroded, reducing the government’s capacity to finance its activity.  
Property 2: The net effects of taxation and education output on factor supply 
(for constant international prices) determine the ‘Rybczynski effect’ on productive 
sectors, causing a biased shift in the production possibilities frontier. 
The model merits the reinterpretation of the standard growth effects from 
changes in stocks of endowments (see Rybczynski, 1955) using expression (3). This 
is, changes in stocks of endowments (second term in the right-hand side of expression   7
(3)), jointly considered with general equilibrium effects from taxation (first term in 
the right-hand side of expression (3)), determine the effective supply of factors, and 
thus, the actual possibilities of expansion of productive sectors. 
Policy implication 1: Given prices and taxes, a better performance in 
education activities leads to increased growth rates in the labour supply and thus, in 
the economy growth possibilities. 
Also, considering expression (3) it can be shown that, for constant prices and 
taxes, an increase in the output of education not mainly based on expanded funds (for 
instance, improved efficiency) determines the changes in the supply of factors, equal 
to the changes in endowments. Thus, only in this case, education alone determines the 
Rybczynski-type growth effects, recovering the standard results. 
Moreover, total differentiation of expression (1) shows that 
() Z C z P C Z L P w C
z Z C Z ˆ ˆ + − =
∧
η      (4) 
So, expressions (3) and (4) show that labour supply and consumption are 
increasing in the education output and real wages, and that, if prices and taxes are 
constant,  Z Z Z L C H ˆ ˆ ˆ = = . 
Policy implication 2: ‘Common sense rule’: Considering the economy as a 
whole, the government would engage in a tax reform intended to raise money to 
expand education activities only if the expected expansion of endowments more than 
compensates for the distortionary effects of taxation on factor supplies. 




z Z Z C z w H Z P w L η ˆ    (5) 
A tax reform designed to finance an increase in the education budget may 
undermine the benefits intended to be reaped from higher production of endowments, 
by causing a fall in factor supplies. A condition to avoid this situation is given in 
expression (5). So, a government intervention under condition (5) ensures a higher   8
factor supply, despite the presence of increased distortions and irrespective of the 
effects of the reform on productive sectors. Thus, (5) is a sufficient condition for a 
labour supply-enhancing government intervention. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A central feature of the model is that the accumulation of endowments 
depends on the output of education, while the changes in labour supply, which 
determine the effective production possibilities frontier, also depend on individuals’ 
decisions on allocation of time. It is shown that, in contrast to the standard approach, 
it is the net effect of prices, taxation, and accumulation of endowments that 
determines the Rybczynski-type growth effects, which may help explain the lack of 
consensus in the empirical literature on education and growth. 
A main contribution of the model is that it allows the discussion of the general 
equilibrium effects of an expansion of education by means of some simple analytics. 
It is shown that the overall effects of the expansion of educational activities depend on 
how the government finances such an expansion. The analysis has policy implications 
for developing countries where the production of endowments is deficient due to 
inefficiencies in the education sector, which may justify a government intervention to 
enhance the sector. In particular, the risks of a labour supply-reducing government 
intervention are highlighted, as the way in which the government finances the 
education budget may undermine the benefits from education when labour supply is 
elastic. That is, a tax reform designed to finance an increase in the education budget 
may undermine the benefits from higher production of endowments, by causing a fall 
in factor supplies. So, it would be convenient to follow a ‘common sense rule’: 
considering the economy as a whole, the government should engage in a tax reform to 
raise the revenue needed to expand education activities only if the expected expansion 
of endowments more than compensates for the distortionary effects of taxation on 
factor supplies. But, interesteringly, the analysis also shows that any improvement in 
the efficiency of providing education not mainly based on expansion of resources (as 
those coming from better organization of schools or teaching processes) will 
unambiguously expand production possibilities.   9
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ANNEX 
1) The composite consumption good 
The composite consumption good  z C  is ‘produced’ by h goods, including 
tradable and informal goods, its price being equal to the cost of its inputs. The 














= ∑  0 > hz δ , ∑ =
h
hz 1 δ  
where  hz D  is the demand for h by household z . The elasticity of substitution is 
() 11 zz ϕ φ =−,  z φ  <1. The household spends its (post-tax) income on consumption 
goods.  z Y  is the (post-tax) income of household z ,  hz
h
h z D P Y ∑ = , where  h P  are 
consumer prices.  
























where  z C  is the composite consumption good and  z A  is a scaling term used to ensure 
that the price of the composite equals the cost of ‘producing’ it. From the first-order 
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Using this expression, the price of  z C , 
z C P , may be derived manipulating the 
equivalence  z C hz
h
h C P D P
























2) Formal and informal labour supply 
The choice between working formally or informally depends on preferences as 
well as on the relative wages in the two sectors. In both skill groups, there is a degree 
of preference for working informally. Each type of labour is allocated between the 
two sources of employment, formal and informal, according to a CET function 
( )
z z z




+ = , with  Fz β >0,  Iz β >0 and  Fz β + Iz β =1, where  Fz L , 
Iz L  are the labour supplied to the formal and informal market, respectively. The 
elasticity of transformation is  ( ) 1 1 − = z z ρ η ,  z ρ  >1. 
The two types of labour are allocated so as to maximise the total wage income 
from the allocation of one unit of  z H . The problem to be solved is 
Max   Iz Iz Fz Fz l w l w +   




Iz I Fz Fz z l l B
θ ρ ρ
β β  
where  Fz w  and  Iz w  are the wages of each type of labour (post-tax for formal labour) 
and  Fz l  and  Iz l  are the inputs of formal and informal labour to one unit of the 
composite  z H . From the first-order conditions, the optimal values for  F l , I l  are 
obtained. The wage of the composite  z H  is Iz Iz Fz Fz z l w l w w . . + = , which gives 
z z z z z
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The total supplies of formal and informal labour are given by  z Fz Fz H l L =  
and  z Iz Iz H l L = . Then, household income is  Iz Iz Fz Fz z z Z L w L w H w Y + = = . Given 
that households spend all their income on consumption goods, it also follows that 
z C z z C P H w
z = . 